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ABSTRACT 
 
Luckenbill, Katie. M.Hum., Wright State University, 2015. Cavalry in Xenophon. 
 
 
Recent scholarship concerning Xenophon’s works has focused on his ideas of 
leadership. A very few, if any, scholars have examined his portrayal of the cavalry and 
the cavalry commander. With so many of Xenophon’s writings involving cavalry, it is 
possible to draw a comparison between Xenophon’s idealized portrayals of cavalry 
operations in the Cyropaedia and Cavalry Commander, and his historical accounts of the 
cavalry, especially with regards to its training and effectiveness in battle. In comparing 
these works, their similarities and differences, a cohesive portrait of Xenophon’s ideal 
cavalry and its commander emerges.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The fourth century BC Athenian writer Xenophon is best known for his historical 
works, which include the Hellenica (Greek Affairs), a continuation of Thucydides’ 
history, and his philosophical writings, which comprise the only extant Socratic dialogues 
other than the more famous dialogues by Plato, as well as his Cyropaedia (Education of 
Cyrus), an idealized view of the career of Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Persian 
Empire. Many of Xenophon’s works involve the cavalry, particularly its execution. 
Xenophon himself was a cavalryman and devoted a great deal of time to the subject. 
Indeed, he wrote two treatises that deal specifically with cavalry: a handbook for 
commanders of the Athenian state cavalry, and a guide to horsemanship.  
Xenophon was born c. 430 BC to an aristocratic Athenian family. The 
Peloponnesian War dominated much of his early life and, as a result of the war, he spent 
a great deal of his youth in Athens. As a young man, he no doubt served in the Athenian 
state cavalry.1 Although Xenophon probably did not agree with the ideology of 
democracy, he did not support the brutality of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens either. 
However, after the fall of the Thirty, the cavalry class was looked upon with suspicion 
and anger. For these reasons, Xenophon was motivated to leave Athens and join his 
friend Proxenus in Asia. He was likely one of many Athenian cavalrymen who made up 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Waterfield (2006), 37  
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the Greek contingent of Cyrus the Younger’s army.2 It is probable that Xenophon arrived 
in Asia with some cavalry experience; certainly he gained much more in the time he 
spent helping lead the Greek retreat, and then as a mercenary for Sparta from 399 BC 
onward. As a result of this experience, Xenophon should be viewed as an authority on 4th 
century BC cavalry operations. 
Recent scholarship concerning Xenophon’s works has focused on his ideas of 
leadership. A very few, if any, scholars have examined his portrayal of the cavalry and 
the cavalry commander. Xenophon’s writing is almost always didactic. He wrote 
primarily as a teacher and philosopher and his works are meant to educate his reader, 
though not always explicitly. Comparing Xenophon’s idealized picture of cavalry in the 
Cyropaedia with his historical accounts, as well as with both his guides for cavalry and 
horsemanship, casts light not only on how the cavalry of Xenophon’s time operated, but 
also how Xenophon believed it should have operated, and why a strong cavalry was 
important.  
A close examination of Xenophon’s works on cavalry shows that he clearly 
believed a strong cavalry was a crucial part of a successful army. His Cyropaedia is his 
idealized account of how a commander should manage all aspects of cavalry operations, 
if given unlimited power to do so. As we will see, the cavalry of Cyrus the Great begins 
small, but grows quickly and is funded through the spoils of war. By Cyrus’ death, the 
cavalry is an immense and highly trained force. Such a force was necessary for the large 
Persian Empire.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Waterfield (2006), 50	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Xenophon’s other works show that Greek cavalry operations were often restricted 
by outside influences, whether due to the circumstances of the army, as in the Anabasis 
and Hellenica, or restrictions imposed by the government, as in the Cavalry Commander. 
Xenophon’s idealized cavalry portrait in the Cyropaedia would not have been sustainable 
in the Greek world. The democracy of Athens did not allow the cavalry commander the 
necessary flexibility to establish a cavalry like Cyrus the Great’s. Further, Sparta did not 
value the cavalry, as Xenophon believed they should have. Also, the Greek city-states 
would not have been able to finance the cavalry using the same means shown in the 
Cyropaedia without constant campaign and expansion. The cavalry was not the pride of 
the Greek army, either. It nearly always served as a subsidiary arm in Greek warfare, 
which relied on hoplites, heavily armed infantrymen, as its main striking arm.  
The purpose of the cavalry force is the crucial differentiating factor among these 
works. Cyrus the Great’s intention in the Cyropaedia is to establish a massive force 
capable of helping him win an empire. His cavalry needs to be of a size and skill level 
appropriate for all the possible uses of cavalry, including deployment in battle, scouting, 
and supporting his large infantry force. By raising and increasing his cavalry force while 
on campaign, Cyrus is able to establish an impressive force with little cost to himself. He 
gathers the horses as spoils of war or gifts, and as such does not have to pay the expenses 
associated with raising, breeding, and purchasing horses.  
In contrast, the Cavalry Commander is an instructional treatise specifically 
addressing the commanders of the Athenian state cavalry. Xenophon’s purpose in this 
work is to instruct these commanders how to raise a force within the constraints of the 
Athenian democracy and at the same time increase the status of the cavalry class, which 
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had fallen into decline since Xenophon’s childhood. The Cavalry Commander can also 
be viewed as his ideal vision for the Athenian cavalry. This treatise is addressed directly 
to the hipparch, the cavalry commander, and offers recommendations on the reform of 
the Athenian state cavalry. The cavalry as a defensive arm to guard against invasion is 
particularly stressed.3  
The Greeks in the Anabasis, like Cyrus the Great, raise a force while in enemy 
territory at little expense, but theirs is a cavalry with a much different purpose and scope 
than Cyrus’. Here, Xenophon is illustrating how a commander can raise an effective force 
with the resources he has at hand. The Greeks are not interested in establishing a force for 
empire, like Cyrus the Great. They form their cavalry so they can make a safe retreat 
from Asia. Therefore, they do not need a corps the size of Cyrus’ and are not interested in 
gathering additional horses wherever possible. Additional horses, their supplies, and 
caregivers would mean less money and provisions for the already disadvantaged Greeks.  
In his encomium Agesilaus, Xenophon praises the Spartan king for establishing a 
well-trained cavalry force at little cost to his state. Agesilaus does this by compelling the 
Ionian Greek cities to supply his cavalry. He is far from home and it would not be 
practical to request Sparta to send him a cavalry. Even if he did, Sparta had a weak 
cavalry tradition and would likely have had no force to send to Agesilaus. Xenophon is 
also illustrating how a reputation for fairness can influence allies to lend assistance to a 
commander. In all of his works on cavalry, he is educating commanders in several 
aspects of cavalry management: how to train and pay the men, where to gather horses and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Anderson (1974), 184 
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their equipment, how to provide for the cavalrymen and their horses, and how properly to 
evaluate the purpose and circumstances of raising a cavalry force.  
 
 
 
 
 
II. THE CYROPAEDIA 
The Cyropaedia is Xenophon’s version of a utopia. As such, it offers Xenophon’s 
vision of what a cavalry could be, if the commander were able to raise and manage his 
force without restraint. He describes Cyrus the Great as having to raise an elite cavalry 
force while on campaign because, according to Xenophon, the Persia of Cyrus’ childhood 
did not value horsemanship. In fact, he says Cyrus was trained to be an excellent 
horseman only while visiting his grandfather in Media (Cyr. 1.3.3). Xenophon quotes 
Cyrus’ father, the Persian king Cambyses, as praising him for establishing the Persian 
cavalry and making the Persians “masters of the plains” (Cyr. 8.5.23). Some scholars 
have doubted the historical accuracy of this point. Christensen asserts that the Persians 
were a semi-nomadic people and the role of horseman was central to the identity of the 
Persian nobility. He also refers to an extant seal of Cyrus’ grandfather that depicts a 
mounted warrior.4 Moreover, Herodotus says that Persian boys learned three things: 
riding, archery, and honesty (Hdt. 1.136). However, this argument is probably irrelevant 
to a discussion of Xenophon’s recommendations for the cavalry in the Cyropaedia. His 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Christensen, 50 
	  6	  
 
	  
purpose was to use Cyrus as a model for his ideal leader, not to deliver an accurate 
history of events. It is reasonable then, to assume that he would take certain liberties with 
the historical account. Christensen does admit that Xenophon’s version of an early Persia 
without a strong cavalry tradition, though it would have been alien to both Greeks and 
Persians, was necessary for depicting the process of introducing a cavalry force.5 
Xenophon was, no doubt, well aware of Herodotus’ Persian history and likely did 
little research beyond his own experiences with Persians prior to writing the Cyropaedia. 
The purpose of the Cyropaedia is to present a portrait of an ideal leader. For Xenophon, 
one aspect of ideal leadership is the ability to raise and implement a strong cavalry force. 
For this reason, he needs Cyrus the Great to be the founder of a strong cavalry force as 
part of his portrait of the ideal ruler. In the Cyropaedia, he depicts Cyrus’ military 
increasing as his power and empire also increases. It is only after Cyrus has established a 
strong cavalry and himself as a formidable leader that he is able to inherit Persia from his 
father. Xenophon needs Cyrus the Great to create his cavalry and military forces from 
scratch so he can illustrate how such a feat might be done. For this reason it is useful to 
hold the Cyropaedia as Xenophon’s ideal vision of a cavalry force and measure the 
cavalries described in his historical works against this model.  
 
 
 
 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CAVALRY 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Christensen, 58 
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In the Cyropaedia, Cyrus the Great has several motivations for establishing an 
effective cavalry. When he sets out from Persia to assist the Medes in war against the 
Assyrians he takes only an infantry force and, initially, relies on his allies to supply 
cavalry (Cyr. 2.1.9). But, as Xenophon illustrates, this leaves the Persians incapable of 
capturing any of the enemy or plunder on their own and heavily dependent on their allies 
for this crucial and profitable task (Cyr. 4.3.5-8). In addition to defeating the Assyrians, 
Cyrus is intending to establish an empire. He finds that it will be much more difficult to 
expand his territory if he is always dependent on his allies for cavalry. In a speech to the 
Persians, Cyrus argues that the addition of a cavalry corps will make them more 
formidable to their enemies. With their infantry force, they are successful in routing the 
enemy, but without cavalry they cannot kill or capture them, and thus fully exploit their 
victories. For this reason, enemy archers and other light-armed troops do not fear 
attacking the Persians from a distance. Most importantly, the Persians’ allies act 
arrogantly toward them because they know that the Persians need their cavalry. Cyrus 
also argues that the allies feel entitled to a greater share of the spoils because they are the 
ones who can capture the plunder and bring it back to camp (Cyr. 4.3.4-7). With 
horsemen of their own, the Persians will no longer be reliant on their allies and will be 
able to keep a greater share of the spoils. Cyrus’ aim is to make the Persians similarly 
eager for the spoils of empire and at the same time remove the vulnerability caused by his 
lack of cavalry. 
While Cyrus the Great tends to deploy the cavalry in the Cyropaedia for offensive 
purposes, the use of cavalry described in the Anabasis is defensive. In the Anabasis, 
Xenophon describes how he helped lead a force of 10,000 Greek mercenaries in Asia. 
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Though their initial purpose was to support the coup attempt of Cyrus the Younger, after 
the latter’s death the Greeks soon find themselves in a desperate march back to the coast 
through mostly hostile territory. The Greeks have no cavalry of their own, but had 
depended on the allied Persian cavalry while with Cyrus the Younger. Now, abandoned 
by their Persian cavalry, they find themselves in a perilous position as they attempt to 
negotiate a truce. Here, Xenophon emphasizes the essential role of the cavalry in 
protecting the army. The Greeks are forced to endure an anxious interval as they await 
the Persian king’s emissaries. The long delay makes many of the Greeks nervous and 
eager to advance, but Clearchus, the most influential general among the Greeks at the 
time, points out that they cannot move because they have no cavalry, while the Persians 
have many skilled horsemen. Without a cavalry to escort them, they are susceptible to 
attack from enemy cavalry and light-troops, especially at the vulnerable rear of the 
marching formation. Moreover, Clearchus argues that the Greeks cannot capture or kill 
anyone they defeat in battle (An. 2.4.6). While they are capable of routing the enemy, 
nonetheless it is too dangerous to pursue them beyond the Greeks’ main body. If the 
Greeks attempted to pursue the enemy with only an infantry force, they would run the 
risk of the enemy turning and cutting them off from the rest of the army. Xenophon 
repeatedly echoes this sentiment throughout the Anabasis and his other works to drive 
home the importance of this key role for cavalry.6  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 An. 3.3.16; Cyr. 4.1.11; Cyr. 5.4.19; In the Cavalry Commander, Xenophon counsels 
the Athenian commander that if he ever finds a part of his enemy’s force weaker than his 
own and separated from the enemy’s main body, he must not miss the opportunity to 
attack. He cautions, however, always to be certain that the enemy force is weaker lest the 
“hunter become the hunted” (Eq. mag. 4.17).  
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Following the loss of their generals, Xenophon makes an interesting speech to the 
despondent Greeks, which downplays the importance of cavalry to the army. This speech 
is important because his argument against the cavalry sheds light on its role and why it 
actually is an important component of the army. It is crucial to remember that Xenophon 
is doing his utmost here to encourage the greatly depressed Greeks. As a cavalryman 
himself, he is well aware of the advantages horsemen have over infantry. In these 
desperate circumstances for the Greeks, Xenophon simply says whatever is necessary to 
rouse their spirits. He argues that it is a cavalry’s riders, not the horses, which do damage 
in battle. No horse, he says, has ever killed a man in battle with a bite or a kick. 
Furthermore, horsemen are more vulnerable than infantrymen because they are afraid not 
only of the enemy, but also of falling from their horses. Contrary to what Xenophon tells 
the Greeks, however, this must not have been an insurmountable problem for ancient 
equestrians. Though they lacked stirrups, cavalrymen were clearly able to maintain their 
seat most of the time as shown by their continued use and success.7 Xenophon further 
claims in his speech that the only benefit the cavalrymen have is in their superior speed of 
flight. As a result, the men should feel confident when facing the enemy cavalry. He also 
elaborates all the vulnerabilities of the Greeks if they do not leave immediately: they are 
now without a guide, without the means to purchase provisions, and there are several vast 
rivers on the way to the coast (An. 3.2.20-26).  
Xenophon’s speech does, in fact, convince the Greeks to assemble and leave 
camp. Gaebel suggests that the Greeks’ willingness to continue without a cavalry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Spence, 43-5; how the ancient cavalrymen addressed this concern will be discussed in a 
following section on equipment.   
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indicates that few of the Greek hoplites present had any experience with horses.8 This is 
highly unlikely however. As will be discussed later, the men who serve in the small 
cavalry force which the Greeks later form in the Anabasis were likely already skilled 
horsemen. Xenophon never mentions any difficulty they might have understandably had 
moving from infantry to cavalry roles. Moreover, a man from Athens, a city-state with a 
strong tradition of horsemanship, is appointed to lead the new cavalry. Further, the Greek 
hoplite force was very successful in the battle at Cunaxa, so they had no reason to fear the 
Persian infantry. It is the Persian cavalry that causes their despondency and hesitation. 
The Greeks know that they will be more vulnerable to light-arm and cavalry attacks while 
marching than they were in battle formation at Cunaxa. So the Greeks are in a pickle. 
They are well aware of the danger they are in without horsemen of their own to respond 
to an enemy cavalry attack. It is certain, however, that if they do not move, they will die.  
Their fears are confirmed when the Greeks first set out on their march homeward 
and Mithradates attacks with 200 Persian horsemen. Xenophon pursues the enemy 
infantry with his rearguard on foot, but they are incapable of overtaking the mounted 
enemy troopers. Additionally, the retreating Persian cavalry is able to shoot arrows and 
javelins behind them, inflicting wounds on the pursuing Greeks. Xenophon says a pursuit 
any distance away from the main body was impossible, which was likely due to the 
dangers of being cut off from the protection of the rest of the army. Without a cavalry 
force to protect the army and pursue the Persians, the Greeks suffer heavily (An. 3.3.6-
11).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Gaebel, 113 
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After their first day’s march, the Greeks have made little progress and are again 
discouraged. Xenophon then makes another speech, which explains the need for a cavalry 
force and light-armed troops. He says that the danger posed by the enemy is their ability 
to attack from a distance, beyond the reach of the Greek bowmen and spearmen. The 
Greek hoplites cannot pursue the Persians safely or effectively because their shields and 
arms heavily encumber them. The Persians have the ability to rush in, strike from a 
distance, and retreat quickly before the Greeks have a chance to catch them. By repeating 
these quick strikes, the Persians are able quickly to wear down the hoplites. Therefore, 
Xenophon says, they must raise a cavalry and light-armed troops to counter this threat. 
Xenophon argues that even a small force will cause some difficulty for the Persians (An. 
3.3.16-19). 
Later in the Anabasis, Xenophon expands on his uses of the cavalry for 
protection. In addition to defending the Greeks as they march, the cavalry is also crucial 
in guarding them as they gather supplies and fodder. During this activity, the Greeks are 
particularly vulnerable because they are out of formation and scattered. In Thrace, the 
Greek army splits into three groups. Xenophon’s contingent has all the remaining Greek 
cavalry, now under the command of Timasion the Dardanian (An. 6.3.7). The Arcadian 
contingent, now without cavalry, has split themselves into even smaller groups to plunder 
Thracian villages. The enemy cavalry and light-armed troops attack the Arcadians and 
surround them. It is not until Xenophon comes to their aid with his cavalry and light 
troops that the enemy flees (An. 6.3.18). Xenophon again illustrates the dangers an 
infantry force without cavalry faces, when Neon, one of the Greek generals, leads his 
men against some Bithynian villages in search of provisions. Pharnabazus’ Persian 
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cavalry surprises them and kills about 500 of the 2,000 Greeks. Xenophon again must 
rescue the survivors (An. 6.4.24). It is this vulnerability that Xenophon later argues is his 
reason for offering the Greeks’ service to the Thracian Seuthes. After the 
Lacedaemonians arrive to take control of the Greek army, Xenophon makes a speech 
defending his decision to put the Greeks in the service of the foreign prince Seuthes at the 
start of the previous winter. He points out that when the Greeks were on the Thracian 
coast they no longer had cavalry or peltasts and so could not capture any slaves or cattle. 
As a result, they were being compelled to purchase insufficient provisions with limited 
means. It was this want of protection and supplies that made the alliance with Seuthes 
necessary (An. 7.6.26-7). 
 Xenophon clearly believes a cavalry is an important asset to any army for both 
offensive and defensive maneuvers. In all of his works regarding cavalry operations, he 
makes it clear that the cavalry was crucial in protecting the army on the march as well as 
harassing enemy troops either in marching formation or scattered on the plain. In his 
other works, Xenophon is showing his reader how a cavalry can be raised in different 
conditions with special demands. He uses examples in the Cyropaedia to show his ideal 
tactics for developing a cavalry for empire.  
 
 
 
 
 
IV. FORMING THE CAVALRY 
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ENLISTMENT 
Xenophon not only clearly illustrates in his works the necessity of the cavalry 
arm, but he also addresses how to establish an effective cavalry force. Through Cyrus the 
Great, Xenophon demonstrates how a commander might go about gathering troops and 
equipment to supply his cavalry. Cyrus lacks horses. Moreover, even the Persian troopers 
he does have lack proper cavalry training. He first trains in horsemanship infantrymen 
from among the Persian Peers. Then, he adds commoners to increase the size of his 
force.9 Being away from home on campaign when he decides to establish a Persian 
cavalry force, Cyrus first appropriates any horses suitable for service from his baggage 
train. Then, he asks his allies that the Persians’ share of the spoils be horses and 
equestrian equipment (Cyr. 4.3.9). Within a matter of days, Cyrus is ready to march with 
2,000 cavalrymen outfitted with all the necessary equipment and a squire for each horse 
(Cyr. 5.2.1). However Cyrus’ Persian horsemen did have some difficulty in their new 
role. Xenophon says many of them fell from their horses during their first raid (Cyr. 
5.3.1). Throughout the Cyropaedia, Cyrus also collects as many horses as possible as 
gifts from friends (Cyr. 6.1.26). Xenophon notes, for example, that the many horses were 
the “most important” of the gifts given to Cyrus by his ally, Gadatas. He uses these to 
increase his cavalry (Cyr. 5.4.29-32). Prior to the battle of Thymbrara, Cyrus’ cavalry 
numbers 10,000 Persians (Cyr. 6.2.7-8). Cyrus continues to collect additional horsemen 
and strengthen his cavalry force while marching toward Babylon. By the end of his 
campaigns, he has amassed a cavalry force 120,000 strong (Cyr. 8.6.19).  
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The Athenian cavalry commander had to go about enlistment in a much different 
way than Cyrus the Great. Xenophon’s instructions to the hipparch include how to recruit 
men for service and how to make cavalry service appealing to wealthy young men and 
their parents (Eq. mag. 1.9). In addition to making the cavalry attractive to potential 
recruits, the commander must also convince the state of the importance of maintaining 
the cavalry and assisting in its financial support (Eq. mag. 5.13). Xenophon recommends 
a force of 1,000 Athenian cavalry and says that resident aliens should be allowed to serve 
in the cavalry to encourage rivalry and discipline among the men (Eq. mag. 9.3-6). 
Marchant suggests these resident aliens would have comprised 200 of the 1,000 Athenian 
cavalry. 10  Xenophon also says that, because of retirement and other reasons, the 
hipparch must be constantly recruiting new cavalry members (Eq. mag. 1.2). He further 
states that men unfit or unwilling to serve should be compelled to help sustain the cavalry 
financially (Eq. mag. 9.5). The role of the Athenian commander is more political than 
simply raising and training a cavalry. The hipparch must be constantly promoting the 
importance of the cavalry so as to both attract new members and encourage state support.  
If the Cyropaedia is Xenophon’s ideal vision of how a commander might raise a 
cavalry on campaign, the Anabasis illustrates the reality in action, albeit on a much 
smaller scale. In the Anabasis, he describes how the Greeks form a small cavalry force 
and a body of light-armed troops from among their own numbers and resources. 
Xenophon says that he brought horses to Asia with him, so it is clear that there are some 
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horses present in the army.11 To establish a cavalry for the Greeks, he assembles the few 
horses he has with him, those left by Clearchus, some captured from the enemy, and 
others from the baggage train. The Greeks also establish a corps of peltasts. Within a day, 
the Greeks have a cavalry force of 50 horses and men. They are outfitted with leather 
tunics and breastplates and put under the command of the Athenian, Lycius (An. 3.3.19-
20). Lane Fox asserts that this small cavalry force may have come from infantry, peltasts, 
or hoplites skilled in horsemanship. They also could have been grooms or camp 
followers.12 Xenophon does not say that these men had any difficulty moving from 
infantry to mounted fighting in the way that Cyrus the Great’s Persian horsemen did. It 
may have been that most of the Greeks’ cavalrymen were experienced Athenian 
horsemen. At this time, not many of the Greek city-states had strong cavalry traditions. 
Athens, however, had a long-standing history of cavalry.13 Furthermore, like Xenophon 
himself, many Athenian horsemen had left Athens following the period of the Thirty 
Tyrants. Waterfield suggests that the new, Greek cavalry commander, Lycius, had 
previously served alongside Xenophon in the Athenian cavalry under the Thirty.14  
The Spartan king Agesilaus’ cavalry needs resemble those of Cyrus the Great’s, 
but also on a smaller scale. He requires a cavalry force only large enough to match the 
Persian horsemen. As in the Anabasis, Xenophon may have played a role in establishing 
the cavalry force under Agesilaus, though with far more resources than his 10,000 Greeks 
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Unfortunately for the Greeks, these 40 Thracians and Cyrus’ Persian cavalry desert to the 
Persian king after the death of Cyrus the Younger (An. 2.2.7).  
12 Lane Fox, 219 
13 Spence, 9; Bugh records evidence of an Athenian cavalry from the Archaic Period 
through the Hellenistic period in his book, The Horsemen of Athens.  
14 Waterfield (2006), 51 
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possessed. When Agesilaus arrives in Asia to help the Greek states on the coast achieve 
their autonomy, he does not have a cavalry. According to Xenophon, the Persian 
Tissaphernes sees this as an exploitable advantage. The Persian satrap Pharnabazus and 
his cavalry also prevent Agesilaus from campaigning in the Phrygian plains, forcing him 
to contemplate raising his own cavalry (Hell. 3.4.12-15).15 In the Hellenica, Xenophon 
says that Agesilaus arrived in Asia without a cavalry, but the Spartan Lysander soon 
brings him 200 horsemen from a Persian ally, Spithridates (Hell. 3.4.10). It is after a 
chance encounter between Agesilaus’ allied cavalry and a contingent of Pharnabazus’ 
Persian cavalry of equal size, that he realizes the superiority of the Persian horsemen and 
arms (Hell. 3.4.13).  
Sparta never possessed a strong cavalry tradition but instead focused on the 
training and implementation of the hoplite arm. The existence of a force called the 
Hippeis, a bodyguard that fought on foot, suggests that the Spartans did at one time have 
either a cavalry or a mounted hoplite force. 16 In 425/4 the Spartans took what 
Thucydides says was the unusual step of raising a cavalry force (that nonetheless was 
only 400 strong) to counter Athenian raids (Thuc. 4.55.2). This was not an effective 
military force, however. Xenophon is particularly critical of the Spartan cavalry at the 
battle of Leuctra in 371 BC. While the Theban cavalry was thoroughly practiced and in 
excellent condition, he says that the Spartan cavalry was “in the worst of shape” (Hell. 
6.4.10). He claims this was because in Sparta, only the wealthiest citizens were required 
to raise warhorses, but the riders were not required to train. Xenophon says these 
cavalrymen, when summoned, would collect their horses and arms and immediately go to 
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the field, i.e., without any training or preparation. He also says that these men were in 
poor physical condition and not eager for honor (Hell. 6.4.12). As a result, at the outset of 
the battle of Leuctra the Thebans quickly defeated them. The Spartan horsemen, in their 
disarray, fell upon their own hoplites at the same time as the Theban infantry (Hell. 
6.4.13). The Spartan cavalry also was defeated and their commander killed in 382 BC 
outside Olynthos. Ten years earlier, a small group of cavalry dismounted to fight on foot 
against the Argives (Hell. 4.4.10). This would seem to illustrate that the Spartans were 
more comfortable fighting on foot than horseback, which further suggests their ineptitude 
or lack of interest in cavalry maneuvers.17  
For these reasons, as well as his distance from home, Agesilaus could not request 
a cavalry contingent from Sparta. Instead, he decides to gather a better cavalry force from 
the allied cities under his command in Asia. He decrees to the wealthiest men in these 
cities that they must become horse breeders. They must also furnish horses suitable for 
cavalry service and, if they do not wish to serve themselves, they must provide a man and 
weapons suitable for service. Agesilaus also chooses cities to furnish whole cavalry 
contingents. Xenophon says that in this way, his cavalry was immediately ready for 
action (Hell. 3.4.13-15).18 The methods Xenophon ascribes to Agesilaus are unique 
among those he describes in his other works. Most notably, he allowed the wealthy class 
to hire mercenaries to serve in their place. So, his cavalry was a mercenary force, rather 
than a citizen corps.19 
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LEADERSHIP 
Xenophon himself was a successful cavalry commander and he understood well 
the importance of good leadership. Even the best horsemen will be ineffective with poor 
guidance. In his treatise on the subject, he says that the cavalry commander must train his 
men to be obedient, because even the best preparations and armor are useless if the men 
will not obey (Eq. mag. 1.7). He recommends that the commander foster kind feelings 
among his men by ensuring they are well supplied and by sharing in times of prosperity 
(Eq. mag. 6.2-3). An effective commander shows his men that he goes to great lengths to 
take good care of them and the horses, and he shares the spoils of his success with his 
men. Xenophon also says it is important that a commander shows himself to be more 
capable than his men in all respects because, in this way, his men are more likely to obey 
his command (Eq. mag 6.2-6).  
In addition to obedience through goodwill, Xenophon offers other examples of 
how a leader might maintain compliance. Cyrus the Great and Agesilaus both use 
competition for prizes and gifts.20 Through their generosity, they enrich their men and 
engender their loyalty. However, in the Anabasis, Xenophon does not have the ability to 
reward his men financially for good behavior. Instead, he uses the effects of peer pressure 
to keep his men in line.21 He argues that the risk of losing one’s good reputation may be 
enough to make the men obedient. An example of such an encounter is between the 
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infantryman, Soteridas, and Xenophon. When Soteridas complains that Xenophon has the 
advantage during an uphill march because of being on horseback while he is on foot, 
Xenophon immediately dismounts and trades places with him. Xenophon struggles under 
the weight of both the hoplite shield and his cavalry breastplate and he falls behind. Soon, 
the other soldiers harass Soteridas until he dismounts and retakes his own shield (An. 
3.4.47-49).  
The circumstances of a cavalry commander in democratic Athens were very 
different from those of the commanders in the Cyropaedia, Anabasis, or Agesilaus. In the 
previous three texts, Xenophon illustrates how to raise an effective force while on 
campaign with limited resources. In Athens, the commander did not have the freedom to 
do what he wanted, as Cyrus the Great did. The hipparch was an elected office and, as 
such, the commander had to prove his effectiveness and popularity both to the men and 
the state.22 State law also determined the number of cavalrymen and their eligibility for 
service (Eq. mag. 1.2). Despite these differences, the Athenian cavalry commander must 
also engender good will and obedience among his men and the recommendations for 
good leadership found in the Cyropaedia and the Anabasis still apply in Athens.  
Xenophon uses the example of Cyrus the Great to illustrate how a commander 
should develop and lead his cavalry in times of expansion and fortune. In the Anabasis, 
however, he depicts a cavalry commander in hostile territory deploying the cavalry so as 
to best effect a safe retreat. His treatise on the duties of the Athenian cavalry commander 
is very different. Xenophon is educating these commanders how to make their cavalry the 
best possible force within the constraints of democracy. Of all the commanders 
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Xenophon describes, the Athenian cavalry commander has the least independence to train 
and deploy his force as he wishes. He also has the most leisure to train his horsemen. 
Unlike the examples of Cyrus, Xenophon, and Agesilaus, who all form their cavalries out 
of immediate necessity, the Athenian commander has a greater luxury to train his men 
over time and in familiar territory through frequent public spectacles and friendly 
skirmishes (Eq. mag. 5.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
EQUIPMENT 
Once the cavalry has been established, commanders must see to it that their men 
and horses are properly equipped. Xenophon says that Cyrus the Great’s Persian 
cavalrymen are armed with bronze frontlets and breastplates. The saddle horses are also 
armed with thigh pieces (Cyr. 6.4.1). Cyrus’ personal staff is supplied with bronze 
corselets and helmets, sabres, and spears made of cornel wood. Their horses are also 
armed with frontlets, breast-pieces, and bronze thigh pieces, which additionally protect 
the thighs of the rider (Cyr. 7.1.2). Xenophon says that Cyrus’ Persian cavalry is the most 
effective of its time and the equipment used by Cyrus is still in use in his own time (Cyr. 
7.1.46-7). 
Xenophon does not have the luxury of using war spoils and gifts to supply his 
cavalry in the Anabasis. The horses for his small force have to come from the baggage 
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train and those that individual, well-to-do Greeks have brought along. The new 
cavalrymen are immediately equipped with leather tunics and breastplates (An. 3.3.20). 
The presence of breastplates seems to imply that there are men already equipped for 
cavalry service in the army. However it is possible that these men are outfitted with 
infantry breastplates. When the Younger Cyrus reviews his troops in the parade at 
Tyriaeum, breastplates are not mentioned among the armor Xenophon describes for the 
Greeks (An. 1.2.16). However, this is not sufficient grounds to suggest that the Greeks 
did not use breatplates, according to Lane Fox. He says the word commonly translated as 
‘tunic,’ chiton, can also be translated as ‘cloak,’ which could have covered a breastplate. 
If Xenophon’s intent is to describe the visual impact of the Greeks at Tyriaeum, he may 
have chosen to omit the mention of a breastplate. Furthermore, the equipment of the 
Greek infantrymen varies depending on their personal wealth. Lane Fox also notes that 
by the end of the march, some Greek infantry do wear breastplates. It is reasonable then 
that Xenophon would focus on the uniform appearance of the Greeks provided by their 
cloaks, not what was beneath them.23 Thus it is likely that there were breastplates 
available for cavalry as well. 
The use of cavalry breastplates is further supported later in the Anabasis, when 
Xenophon relates an instance, mentioned above, when he dismounts from his horse 
during a march uphill because of the grumblings of an infantryman. He says his progress 
is slowed because of the weight of the cavalry breastplate he wears (An. 3.4.44-9). This 
seems to imply that there is a difference between a cavalry breastplate and a hoplite 
breastplate. Xenophon, at least, was wealthy enough to afford cavalry arms and it is 
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reasonable to assume, because he brought horses with him from Greece, that he also 
brought his cavalry armor. The Greeks are also successful in capturing some enemy 
cavalry and may have appropriated the captured arms for their own use (An. 3.4.1-5).  
Xenophon offers the most detail concerning armor and equipment in his two 
treatises on horsemanship and cavalry. In Athens, horses are supplied to the cavalry by 
the wealthy class and through state loan (Eq. mag. 1.19). The law also requires that 
cavalrymen spend their pay on their arms (Eq. mag. 1.23). In his treatise on 
horsemanship, Xenophon describes at length how both the rider and horse should be 
equipped. He says that the rider must wear a fitted breastplate with an additional piece to 
protect the neck. He recommends the Boeotian style helmet and a piece of armor to 
protect the left arm from the shoulder to the elbow. He also recommends that the right 
arm be fully protected by detachable flaps that will allow for freedom of movement when 
the rider throws the javelin (Eq. 12.7). For the horse, Xenophon recommends head, chest, 
and thigh pieces. The thigh pieces for the horse, like those used by Cyrus the Great in the 
Cyropaedia, will also serve to protect the thighs of the rider. Xenophon says that the 
horse’s belly, which is its most vital and weakest part, must be protected by a cloth that 
will also serve to help the rider’s seat (Eq. 12.8-9).  
For offensive weapons, Xenophon recommends the sabre over the thrusting sword 
because of its greater efficiency in close combat. Spence suggests that Xenophon 
preferred the machaira or kopis sword because it was shorter and better suited to an 
overhand, slashing motion.24  Anderson further notes that the sword he recommends was 
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curved to allow for the best slashing motion.25 Xenophon also prefers the Persian cornel 
wood javelins to the weak and cumbersome long spear (Hell. 3.4.14). He suggests that 
each rider should carry two javelins and a sabre (Eq. 11-12). The javelins are used for 
long-distance fighting, the sabre for close combat.  
Moreover, Xenophon recognized that the primary vulnerability of any mounted 
warrior is the instability of his seat. As noted above, ancient cavalrymen rode without the 
assistance of saddle or stirrups. Anyone who has ever sat on a bareback horse knows how 
unbalanced and easily jostled the rider is. In response to this vulnerability and the need of 
a cavalryman to pull up quickly and turn his horse, Xenophon offers two solutions. The 
first is the kind of bit used in training a horse. It is a well-known fact among equestrians 
that the harsher the bit, the quicker the response will be from the horse. In his treatise on 
horsemanship, Xenophon recommends that young horses be trained with a harsh bit with 
sharp edges so the horse will not grab hold of it with his teeth. As Anderson notes, the 
severity of this type of bit is visible on the horses of the Parthenon frieze. These horses 
are depicted as either over-bent, with their noses in their chests, or with their mouths 
open and their lower jaw forced back with their heads in the air in an effort to lessen the 
pressure of the bit.26 The severity of these bits may seem overly harsh or even cruel to a 
modern reader, but they were necessary to maintain control of a horse without the aid of 
stirrups for stability. In addition to a harsher bit, Xenophon also recognized the 
importance of the rider’s posture. He instructed the rider to adopt an upright position with 
the legs beneath the rider, but not with his thighs horizontal. This position allows the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Anderson (1974), 76 
26 Anderson (1974), 188 
	  24	  
 
rider a more secure seat and better control through his thighs, which Xenophon says 
enables the rider to use his weapons more effectively (Eq. 7.5-6).  
 
 
 
 
TRAINING 
An obedient and well-equipped force is essential to success, but these qualities do 
not replace the importance of training. Xenophon says that it is the cavalry commander 
who is responsible for the training and quality of his force (Eq. mag. 1.3). He must make 
sure that every rider can mount from the spring, maintain his seat in all terrains, throw a 
javelin while mounted, and be efficient in “all forms of horsemanship” (Eq. mag. 1.5). 
Xenophon stresses that young men be taught early how to mount from the ground, but 
says it is acceptable for older men to mount with assistance as in the Persian fashion (Eq. 
mag. 1.17).  
Xenophon recommends that commanders make themselves and their men familiar 
with as many roads as possible in both friendly and hostile territories (Eq. mag. 4.6). Of 
course, this is not practical for the commanders of the Anabasis or Agesilaus who fight in 
foreign land. The Athenian cavalry, however, operates at home and nearby and so can 
expect to become familiar with the territories in which they fight. Xenophon also 
recommends Athenian commanders conduct public displays and offer prizes for 
proficiency and skill to motivate the men to practice (Eq. mag. 1.26). Additionally, he 
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says that a commander should stage sham fights to gauge the condition of his cavalrymen 
and horses (Eq. mag. 5.4).  
Xenophon describes how best to train an effective force while on campaign in the 
Cyropaedia. He portrays Cyrus the Great becoming a skilled horseman through constant 
practice hunting in his grandfather’s lands (Cyr. 1.4.5). In the Cyropaedia and other 
works, Xenophon argues that hunting is an excellent way to practice cavalry operations. 
His specific reasons for why hunting offers the best possible training in horsemanship 
are: it teaches the rider to have a firm seat in all kinds of footing, to pursue prey wherever 
it runs, and it trains men to endure hardship, heat, cold, hunger, and thirst (Cyr. 8.4.34-
36). Cyrus the Great also orders his satraps to use hunting exercises to train their 
cavalries (Cyr. 8.6.10). Xenophon repeats the importance of hunting to cavalry training in 
his treatise on the subject. He says that this sport is, “the means by which men become 
good in war” (Cyn. 1.18).  
The circumstances of war, however, do not offer the leisure to train through 
frequent hunting expeditions and commanders must sometimes find other means to train 
their men. While on campaign, Cyrus the Great faces the challenge of training his newly 
formed cavalry force as quickly as possible. He recognizes the value of hunting as 
practice for war, but he does not have the time for the sport. To expedite the training of 
his cavalry, he requires that cavalrymen ride wherever they go and carry their corselets 
and lances, as Cyrus himself does (Cyr. 4.5.58). Agesilaus, Xenophon implies in the 
Hellenica, assembles a force that is largely mercenary. He requires the wealthy to supply 
a man already capable of service and some cities to supply whole contingents of cavalry. 
He also says that Agesilaus causes the city of Ephesus, where his force is gathered, to 
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look like a “workshop for war” as his cavalry and infantry train (Hell. 3.4.17). As 
Xenophon recommends a good commander should do in Cavalry Commander, Agesilaus 
offers prizes to those contingents that perform the best. In this way, he motivates his men 
to train on their own accord frequently (Hell. 3.4.16). In the Anabasis, Xenophon does 
not go into great detail about training. This is understandable because the force is a small, 
makeshift body formed out of necessity. Nor do they have the same leisure that Agesilaus 
enjoys to train the cavalry. As noted previously, it is also reasonable to assume that the 
force is primarily comprised of men who already have experience in horsemanship.27  
Xenophon clearly believes that training through practice in hunting, as well as 
friendly sparring, as it were, is essential to the quality of a cavalry force. He feels the best 
training comes through varied practice on all kinds of terrain so that the horsemen might 
be prepared for whatever they may encounter in foreign territory. He recognizes, 
however, that this type of training is not always practical. For this reason, he offers 
suggestions for other techniques that can be used away from home, such as practice 
through competition or capturing plunder whenever possible. Xenophon also understands 
that men are not likely to train without some motivation and instructs commanders in 
how best to incite their men to practice their skill. Commanders of other regiments, not 
just the cavalry, could use many of the techniques Xenophon suggests, such as offering 
prizes.  
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PROVISIONS AND PAY 
Once a commander has established his cavalry force and provided for their 
equipment and training, he must address how to pay and provide supplies for both his 
troops and their animals. Procuring enough supplies while on campaign could be 
difficult. While Xenophon does not go into detail about the rations required for horses, 
some figures can be estimated from other sources. In his study of Alexander the Great’s 
Macedonian army, Donald Engels has estimated the necessary rations for cavalry horses 
in campaign conditions. He found that, depending on temperature, horses on military 
campaign required an average of 8 gallons (or 80 pounds) of water and 20 pounds of 
grain and fodder per day. So, Alexander’s estimated 6,100 cavalry, marching from the 
Hellespont to Gaugamela, required 122,000 pounds of feed and 488,000 pounds of 
water.28 These rations must have been similar to the requirements of the cavalry horses 
Xenophon discusses in the Cyropaedia and the Anabasis, as they were marching through 
similar terrain and climate as Alexander’s cavalry.29 Finding sources for water and feed 
enough for both the men and animals must have been a primary concern for commanders. 
For the cavalry of the Cyropaedia, provisions were gathered through conquest on 
campaign and through gifts in friendly territories. Cyrus the Great uses funds captured 
from the enemy to pay both his cavalry and his infantry. The cavalry received pay twice 
that of the infantry so that they “all may have the wherewithal to buy whatever [they] still 
may need” (Cyr. 4.5.41). Traditionally, the cavalry were paid substantially more than the 
hoplites, likely because of the costs associated with feeding and maintaining a horse. This 
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also implies that it was the individual cavalryman’s responsibility to provide feed and 
water for his horse.   
Xenophon records the greatest detail about Athens’ system for maintaining its 
cavalry in his treatise Cavalry Commander. For the Athenians, the state helped defray 
some of the costs associated with maintaining a horse. He says that the state supported an 
expenditure of nearly 40 talents a year on cavalry so that they might be ready at a 
moment’s notice (Eq. mag. 1.19). The state also gave assistance to troopers in the 
purchase of horses through a state loan, or katastasis. Athens further provided a daily 
ration allowance for feed called a sitos. These loans only covered a portion of the costs, 
however. The state still relied on the support of the wealthy for the maintenance of the 
cavalry corps.30 It is also important to note that the katastasis was only a loan and the 
cavalryman was expected to reimburse the state in full. This means that cavalry service 
was still restricted to wealthy Athenians. It is likely that these loans were meant to assist 
men of means who lacked the ready capital to purchase a cavalry horse. Furthermore, it is 
uncertain how much of the purchase price these loans covered.31 
Providing for a cavalry on campaign, as Xenophon notes, could be much more 
challenging. In the Anabasis, Xenophon praises Cyrus the Younger for his habit of giving 
provisions and fodder to his friends in need (An. 1.9.27). However, Cyrus’ army is very 
large and he could not have been expected to provide fodder for every horse. Cyrus the 
Younger’s army is forced to march stretched out in a single, long column along the river 
so that all the men and animals have access to water. It is for this reason, among others, 
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that Cyrus’ army has such difficulty getting to their battle positions at Cunaxa.32 During 
their retreat, the Greeks in the Anabasis are forced to march along the Tigris River 
because they had exhausted the provisions along the Euphrates while with Cyrus’ army.33 
The Greeks are also marching through Persian controlled territory and acquiring 
provisions is one of the biggest challenges they face. In friendly territories they purchase 
provisions from markets, but in hostile territory, they must obtain them by plundering.  
Toward the end of their march, the Greeks find their supplies low and their funds 
exhausted. It is easy to see how quickly a cavalryman’s funds could become drained if he 
alone is responsible for supplying his horse with feed and water. On campaign, there is 
little opportunity for horses to graze. This was especially true for the Greeks of the 
Anabasis as they were making a hasty retreat. Feeding even their small cavalry of 50 
horses must have been difficult in hostile territory where supplies were scarce, especially 
during the winter. Applying Engel’s above estimate of cavalry rations suggests that the 
Greeks’ small cavalry alone required 4,000 pounds of water and 1,000 pounds of feed 
each day. Water could be obtained from rivers whenever possible, but the Greeks were 
forced to march through mountainous terrain which not only decreased the availability of 
rations, but also likely increased the need as the horses would be working much harder to 
cross the mountainous terrains than they had worked to cross the plains. For a horse 
performing hard labor, Engels increases their necessary rations by an additional 4-12 
pounds of feed and up to 15 gallons of water per day.34 What little rations the Greeks 
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possessed must have gone quickly. Surely their low supplies are a key factor when the 
Greeks decide to offer their services to the Thracian prince Seuthes. 
In contrast, Agesilaus, as mentioned, is able to compel wealthy citizens to supply 
horsemen for cavalry service, as well as their pay, supplies, and horses (Hell. 3.4.15). 
Like Cyrus the Great, he is also generous in his gifts and offers prizes for excellence in 
performance in all areas including horsemanship (Hell. 3.4.16). Through this practice, 
Agesilaus enriches his men and motivates them to train. In the Hellenica, Xenophon 
includes other examples of allied cities forced to contribute funds for the maintenance of 
the military, similar to the stipulations Agesilaus places on the Greek cities in Asia. In 
one instance, the Spartans, seeking to raise a large infantry force, require their allies to 
provide either men for service or money. Xenophon specifically says that 3 obols is 
payment for one infantryman and cities that used to provide cavalry are obligated to 
provide the pay of 4 hoplites in place of each horseman (Hell. 5.2.21). This clearly 
illustrates the much greater resources required to support cavalrymen versus infantrymen.  
 In his works, Xenophon illustrates various ways for a commander to provide for 
his men in times of both prosperity and need. Cyrus the Great is Xenophon’s example of 
how a successful commander best benefits his men and provides for them while on 
campaign at little cost to himself. Alternatively, using the example of the Anabasis, he 
shows how a commander with limited provisions can sustain his army in foreign 
territories. In all of his examples, Xenophon says it is important to maintain the favor of 
the army.  
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V. DEPLOYMENT 
No matter how well provisioned or trained, the cavalry will still be useless if the 
commander is not able to deploy it effectively. Xenophon addresses this matter in all of 
his works regarding cavalry. In the Cavalry Commander, he warns that every horseman 
should know two things: at what distance his horse can overtake a man on foot and how 
much of a head start his horse will need to escape. Further, a cavalry commander must 
know on what types of terrain the cavalry has an advantage and how to make a small 
force appear large (Eq. mag. 5.1-2). The cavalry commander, according to Xenophon, 
must always be ready to capitalize on an enemy’s mistakes, but also be prepared to 
withdraw immediately so that the enemy does not have time to regroup (Eq. mag. 7.7-
10). Xenophon discusses many different kinds of deployment for the cavalry that a 
commander must be familiar with, including: reconnaissance, raids, the protection of the 
army during a march, harassment of an enemy force and how best to utilize the cavalry 
both offensively and defensively in battle.  
 
 
 
 
RECONNAISANCE  
Some of the most common uses of cavalrymen are independent of the army.35 In 
the Cavalry Commander, Xenophon recommends that the hipparch use spies whenever 
possible, but also that he spy on the enemy himself to get the most accurate information 
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(Eq. mag. 4.16). Horsemen are particularly useful, because of their speed, in 
reconnoitering what lay ahead of the army and warning their commander if any enemy 
are in the area. They could also be utilized in capturing men wandering about the plain 
that could provide information. These actions keep the main body of the army from 
coming upon the enemy unexpectedly while out of formation.  
Xenophon stresses the use of cavalry reconnaissance in his treatise on the cavalry 
commander (Eq. mag. 4.4). After receiving the news that the Assyrian king has fled to 
Lydia, Cyrus the Great quickly prepares his forces and sets out again in pursuit of the 
enemy. He arranges his cavalry at the front of the march and sends scouts ahead of the 
main body (Cyr. 6.3.2-4). As Cyrus’ force begins to catch up with the Assyrian army, his 
scouts catch sight of men gathering fodder. Cyrus then sends out a contingent of cavalry 
to capture the men on the plain so he might interrogate them (Cyr. 6.3.5-6). By taking 
these measures, Cyrus is able to learn the location and actions of the enemy.  
Xenophon also uses scouts in the Anabasis whenever possible. As he prepares to 
rescue the Arcadians as they are being besieged on a hill by Thracians, he sends Timasion 
in advance with the cavalry to scout what lay ahead “in order that nothing may escape 
[their] attention” (An. 6.3.11-18). Agesilaus also employs cavalry for reconnaissance in 
the Hellenica when he sends a small group of cavalry to scout over a hill. Unfortunately 
for this group, they encounter a similarly sized contingent of Persian cavalry on the hill 
for the same purpose. Agesilaus’ cavalry engages the Persians, but the Persian cornel 
wood spears prove stronger than the Greeks’ (Hell. 3.4.13-14).  
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Reconnaissance was an important, but sometimes over-looked use of the cavalry 
by commanders.36 There is an example of such a lapse in the Anabasis prior to the battle 
of Cunaxa when the Younger Cyrus’ army comes upon the Persian king’s force 
unexpectedly. While the king’s army approaches already in battle formation, Cyrus’ army 
needs several hours to form the battle line. Xenophon says his army is thrown into 
confusion at the news of the king’s approach. Despite Cyrus’ men moving with the 
greatest urgency, it still takes nearly half the day to prepare for battle (An. 1.8.1-8). The 
Hellenica offers another example of such a lapse when Derkylidas neglects to deploy 
scouts when pursuing Tissaphernes in 397 BC. He believes the enemy is far ahead and 
allows his army to become disordered. It is not until he spots enemy scouts that he sends 
men to reconnoiter what lay ahead. Derkylidas’ scouts soon report that the enemy is close 
and already in battle formation. Like Cyrus, Derkylidas then must collect his men as 
quickly as possible (Hell.  3.2.14-6).  
 
 
 
 
RAIDS 
 Outside of battle, the cavalry is primarily involved in raids and depriving the 
enemy of property, either by destroying it or by removing it as plunder. The cavalry is 
particularly well suited for this practice because of its ability to arrive quickly before the 
inhabitants have the opportunity to remove their property to safety. Raids are popular 
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among the cavalry because of the opportunity for enrichment. 37 As mentioned above, 
when convincing the Persians to form a cavalry force, Cyrus the Great points out the 
enhanced prospects for capturing plunder. It does not take him long to deploy his new 
cavalry for this purpose (Cyr. 5.3.1).  
 Infantry were not well suited to go on raids without a cavalry escort because they 
were especially vulnerable to attack. Xenophon records one such instance in the Anabasis 
when the Greek general Neon leads a group of 2,000 infantry to plunder Bithynian 
villages and capture provisions. Pharnabazus, hoping to keep the Greeks out of Phrygia, 
comes to the aid of the Bithynians and kills 500 of the Greeks while they are scattered. 
The Greeks then retreat to the heights where they become trapped. Xenophon rescues the 
survivors with his cavalry and guards their retreat back to camp (An. 6.4.23-27). Here, 
Xenophon stresses the vulnerability of the Greeks without a cavalry.  
The Hellenica also includes examples of cavalry forces responding to raids in 
their own territories. Xenophon warns cavalry commanders, however, against becoming 
overzealous in their responses. In 381 BC, the Olynthians make a raid against Apollonia, 
a Spartan ally. In response, the Apollonian commander Derdas readies his cavalry and 
waits for the Olynthian horsemen to come close to the city. Once they do, he rushes out 
with his own horsemen and quickly puts them to flight. Xenophon says that Derdas does 
not halt his pursuit until he chases the Olynthians back to their own city (Hell. 5.3.1-2). 
Derdas is likely feeling confident because of his earlier victory over the Olynthian 
cavalry, but Xenophon cautions against this type of feverish chase and he immediately 
recounts another similar pursuit that does not end so well for the pursuers. As the Spartan 
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Teleutias approaches Olynthos with his army, the Olynthian cavalry comes out of the city 
and crosses a river toward the opposing army. When Teleutias sees them, he sends his 
peltasts to chase them. Xenophon says that the peltasts are too bold in their pursuit and 
cross the river, separating themselves from the rest of the army. The Olynthians, 
recognizing the peltasts’ mistake, turn and attack. Teleutias’ response, according to 
Xenophon, is a rash act of anger. He immediately sends his cavalry and infantry in 
pursuit. The Olynthians then send out more cavalry, peltasts, and finally their hoplites. 
By this time, the Spartan line is disordered, they are vulnerable to missiles from the walls 
of the city, and the Olynthians quickly gain the advantage. Teleutias is killed and the rest 
of his army is forced to flee (Hell. 5.3.3-6). In this instance, Xenophon is illustrating that 
the cavalry, while effective in their ability to pursue a routed enemy, can become 
vulnerable if separated from the main body of the army by too great a distance.  
In some instances, the threat of a raid could be enough to extort money from an 
enemy.38 Xenophon records an example of this tactic in the Hellenica. The 
Chalcedonians, expecting an attack by the Athenians, transfer all of their portable 
property to the protection of the Bithynians. The Athenian Alcibiades then leads the 
cavalry, supported by a hoplite force, against the Bithynians. He threatens to attack unless 
they give over all the property of the Chalcedonians, which they do (Hell. 1.3.1-3). 
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MARCHING FORMATION 
Aside from raids, the most common use of the cavalry seen in Xenophon’s works 
is during the march. In the fifth book of the Cyropaedia, Xenophon offers a detailed 
account of how Cyrus determines his marching formations and it is here that the benefit 
of developing a highly flexible force is apparent. When moving his entire army quickly, 
Cyrus employs different formations for daytime and nighttime marching. If an army must 
march at night then the commander must ensure that its various contingents do not 
become separated. To address this issue, Cyrus arranges his Persian cavalry single file, in 
companies, after the camp followers, and with the allied cavalry bringing up the rear. 
Cyrus further orders that no one be allowed to fall behind the horsemen (Cyr. 5.3.41). In 
this way, Cyrus is able to keep his whole force close together and prevent the cavalry 
from outpacing the infantry in the darkness. During the march, Cyrus also uses horsemen 
to send messages to the front of the line while he rides back and forth inspecting the men 
and keeping order (Cyr. 5.3.54). In daylight, Cyrus changes the marching order by 
bringing his cavalry to the front of the formation to protect against the enemy and engage 
in pursuit if necessary. He leaves the Cadusian cavalry behind the infantry to protect the 
rear against enemy attack (Cyr. 5.3.57). These are the same marching tactics used in the 
Anabasis, and Xenophon recommends them to Seuthes who uses them successfully (An. 
7.3.37-9). 
For the Greeks in the Anabasis, their initial marching order is a hollow square 
with the baggage train and camp followers protected in the center. This formation is a 
disaster because they are without a cavalry and vulnerable to long distance attacks by the 
enemy (An. 3.3.6). In response to this, the Greeks adjust their marching formation by 
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adding their new cavalry and light-armed troops. The Greeks soon realize, however, that 
the army would often become disordered when using a square formation at close quarters 
with the enemy. At various times, the wings are forced together or apart because of the 
terrain. When the wings are forced together by a narrow road, the men are squeezed 
together and become disordered. Alternatively, when they are drawn apart, they become 
scattered and gaps open up in the lines (An. 3.4.19-20). In response to these difficulties, 
Xenophon says that the generals form six companies of 100 men with captains for each 
company, platoon, and squad. In this way, the Greeks are able to maintain their order 
through all types of terrain (An. 3.4.21). Though Xenophon does not say explicitly where 
the cavalry is positioned in this formation, it is likely that it remains split between the 
front and rear of the army. Xenophon says in this same passage that the Persians keep up 
skirmishes at the rear of the Greeks’ formation. He also says later that if any of the army 
is needed to lend aid elsewhere in the formation, they move to that spot (An. 3.4.23).  
In the Hellenica, Xenophon describes an instance when Agesilaus used the hollow 
square march formation also seen in the Anabasis. The cavalry is divided between the 
rear and the front of the square. When the Thessalians and their allies begin to attack 
Agesilaus’ army from behind, he sends the entire cavalry, except his guard, to the rear. 
Once both sides are formed for battle, the Thessalians, faced with engaging Agesilaus’ 
cavalry and hoplites, turn about and begin to retreat slowly, reluctant to engage both 
cavalry and hoplites. Agesilaus’ troops at first follow cautiously. Once he recognizes the 
mistakes both sides are making, he acts quickly. He sends his own guard to the rest of the 
cavalry with orders to charge the Thessalians and not let up in their pursuit. The 
Thessalians are caught off guard and in a panic many of them flee as far as they can. 
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Xenophon says Agesilaus considers his cavalry’s victory here to be particularly notable 
because the Thessalians believe themselves to be the best cavalrymen (Hell. 4.3.3-8).39 
 
 
 
 
PROTECTING THE ARMY 
A marching army faced two primary dangers: coming upon an enemy army 
unexpectedly and assault from enemy cavalry and light troops.40 Small numbers of 
cavalry could be highly effectual if handled properly. The cavalry is most effective 
against scattered troops. Infantry caught out of formation or whose formation is broken 
by a previous assault are particularly vulnerable to cavalry attack because of their speed 
and maneuverability. Spence says, “Xenophon envisaged small bodies of cavalry 
hovering around superior numbers of enemy like a beast or bird of prey until an 
opportunity to strike presented itself. When it did so, the cavalry would employ its speed 
and mobility to strike and then retire.”41 Xenophon says a small force can do damage to a 
large army on the march by harassing the enemy in areas where a large force has no 
advantage, such as narrow roads and river crossings. He says the cavalry can “dog the 
enemy’s steps without danger” (Eq. mag. 7.10-11). This is the exact tactic Mithradates 
employs in the Anabasis in his assault against the Greeks as they march (An. 3.3.6-11).  
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The primary role of the cavalry during a march is protecting the rest of the army. 
Xenophon offers many examples of situations where an infantry force requires cavalry 
protection. In the example cited above, Agesilaus uses his cavalry while marching 
through Thessaly for this very purpose (Hell. 4.3.3-6).42 On another occasion, Agesilaus 
must march through a narrow mountain pass in Acarnanian territory. Acarnanian light 
troops on the mountain ridges inflict considerable damage on the Spartans because there 
is not enough space for their cavalry and hoplites to charge their attackers and prevent the 
enemy light troops from escaping. Agesilaus can only counter attack on the side where 
the mountain is more accessible to his hoplites and cavalry. His solution to this difficulty 
is to use both the infantry and cavalry to pursue the Acarnanians up the mountain. 
Despite the enemy wounding many with spears thrown from above, the Spartans are 
successful once they are able to get close (Hell. 4.6.11-12).   
Xenophon’s Greeks in the Anabasis form their cavalry out of necessity to protect 
the army as it retreats. Although they have only 50 horsemen, this force is sufficient 
because peltasts and a large hoplite force support it. When Mithradates returns the second 
day with 1,000 horsemen expecting an easy victory, the Greeks’ new cavalry and light-
armed troops catch him by surprise. The Persians are quick to flee despite their advantage 
in cavalry numbers. They are only confident enough to attack the Greeks when they are 
able to do so from a distance and can retreat without being pursued. Although Xenophon 
warns his cavalry against pursuing the Persians too far from the main body of the army, 
they are able to do enough to keep the enemy at bay. The success of the 50 Greek 
cavalrymen was due likely to both the speed they provided to the Greek army and the 
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psychological shock they inflicted on the enemy expecting an easy victory over an 
infantry force.43  
The Hellenica also offers examples of the vulnerability of infantry forces lacking 
a well-deployed cavalry. The well-known Spartan disaster at Lechaion in 390 
demonstrates clearly both the vulnerability of an unescorted hoplite force on the march 
and the danger a badly handled cavalry can pose to its own force. The Athenian 
Iphikrates and his peltasts attack a Spartan regiment marching past Corinth. The Spartan 
hoplites suffer heavily during the assault and are unable to pursue effectively the light-
armed peltasts because of their heavy shields. When the hoplites quit the pursuit they 
were scattered and Iphikrates’ men are able to turn and resume their attack (Hell. 4.5.12-
15). Significantly, a cavalry force does come to the assistance of the beleaguered Spartan 
hoplite regiment. However, as Xenophon notes, the commander badly mishandles the 
cavalry during a counter attack. When the enemy peltasts give way, the cavalrymen fail 
to use their advantage in speed and pursue the enemy as far as possible. Instead they keep 
pace with the hoplites as they attack and retreat. According to Xenophon, the failure of 
the cavalry to capitalize on their advantages causes the enemy to become bolder. The 
Spartans lose half of an entire hoplite regiment (Hell. 4.5.16-18).  
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BATTLE 
 The cavalry played several roles in all phases of battle. Prior to the battle, the 
cavalry’s responsibilities include reconnaissance of the enemy and battlefield and the 
protection of their troops’ deployment. During the infantry clash, the cavalry provides 
support by attacking enemy foot troops whenever possible.  If victorious, the cavalry’s 
role is to pursue and capture, or kill, as many of the enemy as they can. If defeated, the 
cavalry is to protect the retreat of the infantry troops.44 
 During the battle, the cavalry is primarily concerned with protecting the hoplite 
phalanx, which was most vulnerable to attack on both flanks and at the rear. Hoplite 
clashes are typically head-on, but it is not unheard of, as Xenophon has Cyrus the Great 
do with his cavalry at the fictional battle of Thymbrara, for a separate body to attack a 
phalanx on either flank. These types of attacks usually involve cavalry or light troops 
because of their mobility and flexibility. In response to this danger, it is general practice 
to protect the flanks with some kind of obstacle, such as a natural barrier like a river, or a 
body of peltasts or cavalry.45  
It is for this reason that Cyrus stations his cavalry on the wings of his phalanx as 
he withdraws his army from the walls of Babylon. After arriving at Babylon and 
surrounding it with his army to survey the walls around the city, Cyrus is preparing to 
draw off his army when a deserter comes out and warns him of the city’s intent to attack 
as his force turns to retreat. The enemy is encouraged because, in order to surround the 
city, Cyrus had drawn up his army in shallow lines. Cyrus quickly devises a tactic to 
withdraw his army safely and, again, the training and flexibility of his army is evident. As 
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he withdraws his forces, he folds the phalanx back on itself, doubling its depth. He also 
stations the cavalry and light armed troops on the wings. In this way, with the phalanx 
doubled, the deeper lines encourage the men, and the cavalry is stationed closer to the 
commander (Cyr. 7.5.3-5).  
 A successful cavalry deployment in battle is illustrated in the engagement 
between the Spartans and their allies against the Olynthians in 382 BC. The Spartan 
commander, Teleutias, stations the allied cavalry on the far right of the phalanx with the 
cavalry led by Derdas on the left. The Olynthians charge the right wing and kill the 
Spartan cavalry commander, putting the rest of the cavalry to flight. Derdas charges 
towards the city with his cavalry from the left and the Olynthian cavalry, afraid of being 
cut off from the city, immediately flee. Derdas’ men are already at the gates, however, 
and are successful in killing many of the enemy cavalry and infantry as they try to re-
enter the city (Hell. 5.2.40-42). Though the Spartan cavalry failed to hold their position, 
Derdas’ men were successful in using their speed and mobility to cut off the retreat of the 
enemy.  
Xenophon again stresses the advantages in speed and mobility of the cavalry, 
even against a much larger force, in his account of the Corinthian war. As Xenophon 
describes in the Hellenica, Dionysus, the tyrant of Syracuse, sends a small force of 
cavalry to aid the Spartans and their allies against the Thebans. Xenophon says that the 
Thebans and their allies were filling up the plain around Corinth and destroying 
everything. The Athenians and Corinthians, intimidated by the enemies’ numbers, do not 
go out to meet them. The small Sicilian cavalry, however, harasses the Thebans by 
continuously riding up alongside them, throwing their javelins, and retreating quickly. By 
	  43	  
 
scattering their numbers and keeping a safe distance from the enemy, the Sicilians are 
able to attack from several positions repeatedly. Xenophon says that they are so confident 
in their ability to flee the enemy that they would sometimes dismount and rest. If any of 
the enemy dared pursue them too far, the Sicilians would turn and counterattack as soon 
as the enemy turned and headed back to the main body of the army. By repeating these 
tactics, the Sicilians successfully inflict heavy damage on the enemy and within a few 
days they help force the Thebans and their allies to retreat (Hell. 7.1.21). 
 
 
 
 
MIXED TROOPS 
Xenophon also advocates the use of cavalry in conjunction with light-armed 
troops and heavy infantry during battle. In his treatise, the Cavalry Commander, 
Xenophon says the commander must remind the state of the value of using the cavalry in 
conjunction with the infantry. He argues that the cavalry can hide the infantry behind and 
among the horses (Eq. mag. 5.13). The term for light-armed troops stationed in some 
fashion among the cavalry is hamippoi. Xenophon says this type of troop also is stationed 
with the cavalry as the rear guard of the Argive army in 369 BC as it withdraws from 
Phleious. The advantages of light troops with cavalry are not evident in this instance, 
however, because a small group of only sixty Phleiasian horsemen attack and rout the 
larger rear guard (Hell. 7.2.4). Xenophon also attests to the existence of a contingent of 
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200 Athenian mounted archers, called hippotoxotai, in his Memorabilia. He says that 
their role is to ride out at the front of a cavalry charge (Mem. 3.3.1).  
Xenophon illustrates the use of mixed infantry and cavalry in his account of the 
battle at Mantineia in 362 BC. The Theban general, Epaminondas, arranges his cavalry in 
a wedge formation with infantry among them. He believes that this formation will allow 
his force to break through the Athenian line and cause it to flee. Despite the failure of his 
forces to follow up on their victory, Epaminondas’ mixed infantry and cavalry is 
successful in disrupting the Athenian line (Hell. 7.5.23-25).  
 
 
 
 
 
VI. TACTICS 
DECEPTION 
Xenophon also demonstrates how to use deception in cavalry tactics. During 
Cyrus the Great’s first expedition into Armenia he devises a plan to lead out his 
horsemen as if on a hunting expedition into Armenian territory. Cyrus describes his plan 
to his men using the metaphor of hunting and refers to the enemy as “game.” He arranges 
his men just as if hunting, which lures the Armenians into a false sense of security (Cyr. 
2.4.16-25). Similarly, in the Cavalry Commander, Xenophon recommends concealing 
outposts and placing a few guards out in the open. By doing this, he says, the enemy can 
be lured into an ambush (Eq. mag. 4.11-12). He also says a cavalry commander should at 
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times feign reluctance and cautiousness so as to lure the enemy into making a mistake 
(Eq. mag. 5.15). 
In the Hellenica, Xenophon records an incident when the Thebans catch 
Agesilaus’ marching army by surprise. While campaigning in Thebes, his army marches 
on one side of a trench while the Thebans move with them on the opposite side. 
According to Xenophon, the Thebans hid their cavalry and launch a surprise attack 
against Agesilaus’ army. However, the Spartan cavalry, together with the hoplites, are 
successful in routing the Thebans. Fortunately for the Spartans, Xenophon says, the 
Thebans act as though they are drunk and discharge their spears too soon (Hell. 5.4.38-
41). Had the Theban cavalry performed better, they could have done significant damage 
to Agesilaus’ force.  
 
 
 
 
 
A SMALL FORCE VS. A LARGE ONE 
In the Cavalry Commander, according to Xenophon, a good leader must know 
how to make a small force seem large and a large one small. By concealing the size of his 
force, as Cyrus the Great does at Thymbrara, he can catch the enemy by surprise (Eq. 
mag. 5.2). Furthermore, Xenophon believes the ability to deploy a smaller body against a 
larger one is essential for a commander. He recognizes that even a small cavalry force 
could be used effectively. He says that a small force can keep an eye on the enemy and 
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rescue property just as well as a large one. Moreover, a small force is easier to hide and to 
keep on constant alert. The bigger the force, the more likely it is to make a mistake either 
by scattering to gather provisions or by becoming separated while marching.  
Xenophon best illustrates his ideal deployment of a smaller cavalry in combat 
against a larger force in his account of the events leading up to the battle of Thymbrara. 
While advancing on the enemy’s army, Cyrus the Great receives word that a large body 
of Assyrian horsemen has been spotted within sight of the plain coming in advance of the 
army. The enemy has sent thirty horsemen against Cyrus’ ten in order to capture his 
lookout post. Cyrus sends out a detachment of his mounted bodyguard and orders them to 
remain hidden until the scouts have left the lookout place. Then this detachment, led by 
Hystaspas, is to attack and pursue the enemy only far enough to ensure the lookout 
remains in Cyrus’ possession (Cyr. 6.3.13-14). This also echoes Xenophon’s sentiment 
that sending a small detachment of cavalry too far away from the main body of the army 
is dangerous (Cyr. 5.4.19).  
Prior to the great battle at Thymbrara, Araspas returns from spying in the enemy 
camp and describes to Cyrus the Great the enemy’s battle formation. He says that the 
infantry and horse are drawn up thirty deep for a width of forty stadia (Cyr. 6.3.19). Here, 
Xenophon details how best to arrange a small force to appear larger and yet still be 
difficult for an enemy to out flank. Cyrus arranges his chariots in a shallow line two deep 
both to make his force appear larger and bring more chariots into action at once (Cyr. 
6.3.21-3). Cyrus further orders that the baggage train and women’s carriages be brought 
up to the battle line to make his shallower line appear deeper and more difficult for the 
enemy to encompass (Cyr. 6.3.30). He then stations two cavalry regiments and his camels 
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at the rear of his battle formation where the enemy cannot see them (Cyr. 6.3.32-33). 
Cyrus stations one group of one hundred chariots in front of his battle formation, directly 
opposite the enemy’s phalanx, and the other two contingents are stationed on the right 
and left flanks of the phalanx (Cyr. 6.3.34). Then, Cyrus orders the two cavalry 
contingents behind the women’s carriages to stay where they are until they see him 
charging the enemy opposite the right wing. At that time, they are to attack those 
opposite them and simultaneously deploy the camels to disrupt the enemy’s cavalry (Cyr. 
7.1.22).  In this way, two cavalry units are able to surprise the enemy line and to follow 
up swiftly on the initial attack.  
As Croesus’ army advances against Cyrus, it surrounds Cyrus’ smaller force on 
three sides. The only portions of Cyrus’ army not encompassed by the enemy are the 
horsemen, hoplites, targeteers, bowmen, and chariots that he has stationed in the rear 
(Cyr. 7.1.24). Cyrus opens the battle by taking a unit of cavalry that he has hidden behind 
his main body against the outer flank of the enemy’s right phalanx. At the same time, a 
similarly hidden cavalry force charges on the left.46 Soon, Cyrus’ smaller force puts the 
Lydians and their allies to flight (Cyr. 7.1.26).  
Xenophon offers several other examples in his works to illustrate how a small, 
well-disciplined force might be deployed effectively against a larger one. In the first 
mention of a cavalry engagement in the Cyropaedia, he says the son of the Assyrian king 
makes a foray into Median land, under the guise of a hunting party. The Assyrian 
arranges the best of his cavalry with himself along the Median outposts, to prevent the 
Medes from coming to the rescue. He then sends out other divisions to capture whatever 
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they can in Median territory. Cyrus’ grandfather, the Median king Astyages, rides out to 
meet the Assyrians scouring his land and young Cyrus the Great follows. Once on the 
field, Astyages halts his forces and surveys the Assyrians. Cyrus advises Astyages that 
his men and horses, though fewer, are superior to those of the Assyrians and it would be 
best to make a charge against the Assyrian cavalry immediately rather than wait for 
reinforcements. At Cyrus’ suggestion, Astyages splits his force in two and sends half the 
cavalry to charge the raiders while Astyages waits with the rest, should the Assyrian 
make a move against them. Cyrus successfully routs the Assyrians, despite his 
overzealous actions in the heat of battle (Cyr. 1.4.16-23). Xenophon recommends that the 
cavalry commander use small cavalry contingents to target enemy outposts because they 
are often weak in numbers and stationed far from the main body. He says that there is no 
booty to capture as good as an enemy patrol (Eq. mag. 7.14-15). 
Though sometimes it is unavoidable, Xenophon warns against taking excessive 
risks (Eq. mag. 4.13). He cautions against a small cavalry unit engaging a larger force if 
preventable. Xenophon offers examples in different works to illustrate the vulnerability 
of a cavalry force without infantry support. One example is Agesilaus’ victory over 
Tissaphernes at the battle of Sardis in 396 BC. The Persian cavalry, noticing a number of 
Greeks plundering villages in the plains, attacks and kills many of them. Agesilaus sends 
his cavalry to the their aid and the Persians array themselves in battle order in response. 
Agesilaus, realizing that the Persian cavalry is unsupported by its infantry, while his own 
infantry force is close at hand and in battle order, quickly gives orders to his cavalry to 
attack the Persians, which he follows with his infantry. Agesilaus’ men are not only 
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successful in routing the Persians but also are able to capture the enemy camp (Hell. 
3.4.22-24).47   
In the Cyropaedia, Xenophon also offers instances of misfortune met by cavalry 
contingents that did not wait for reinforcements. As Cyrus the Great and his army are still 
marching to his aid, Gadatas is deceived by the Assyrian king and foolishly sends his 
force in pursuit of a small decoy unit (Cyr. 5.4.4). The Assyrians ambush Gadatas’ force 
and he only avoids defeat when Cyrus fortuitously arrives with his army. Cyrus then 
quickly arranges his army in battle order, which is sufficient to turn back the pursuing 
enemy. He then sends out his cavalry to pursue and capture any remaining enemy, which 
they do, including several chariots (Cyr. 5.4.7-9).  Not long after this, the Cadusians 
make a foray into Babylon without consulting Cyrus first. They are away from the main 
body of the army in a small cavalry force. While the horsemen are scattered, the 
Assyrians attack and kill many of them. Unaware of the Cadusians’ absence, Cyrus is 
unable to lend assistance (Cyr. 5.4.15-9).  
 
 
 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 In his works regarding cavalry, Xenophon shows the value of a mounted force to 
an army and the value of a quality commander to that force. As examples above have 
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shown, even a highly trained cavalry could fail if not properly managed. Xenophon has 
clear opinions on what makes the ideal cavalry commander. He lists several qualities in 
his treatise to the Athenian commanders and illustrates those qualities in his examples of 
Cyrus the Great and Agesilaus. In short, his ideal commander is one who provides for the 
supplies, equipment, and training of his men and knows how to use his force effectively 
in a variety of situations including marches, raids, reconnaissance, and battle. The 
commander not only knows how to raise and establish an effective force, but also is able 
to motivate his men, and to persuade his state to desire a cavalry. The ideal commander, 
as Xenophon sees him, knows how best to train his force and motivate his men. As 
mentioned, He believes cavalrymen should be trained to ride on as many different types 
of terrain as they are able and should practice through friendly skirmishes and 
competitions. He also says hunting is the best exercise to train mounted troops for war 
and the best commanders will use this sport to train their men whenever possible.  
 Xenophon writes about different commanders in different types of situations. 
Cyrus the Great is his ideal commander for the sort of fictionalized utopia he presents in 
the Cyropaedia. Cyrus is an influential speaker, a cunning tactician, and creative in the 
ways he obtains supplies and equipment. He is also a Persian prince establishing a mighty 
empire. He has much more freedom than his Greek counter parts of the Anabasis or the 
Hellenica. Many of his methods would not be practical for the other commanders 
Xenophon discusses, though there is still value in their examples. Cyrus the Great is his 
ideal commander for a cavalry whose role is to help establish a formidable empire. As 
mentioned, the purposes motivating the other commanders in Xenophon’s works are very 
different from those pushing Cyrus to establish his cavalry. The Athenian commander is 
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looking only to maintain a force to support Athens. He does not want to expand his force 
and he has clear rules to follow in how he pays and manages his cavalry. Xenophon in the 
Anabasis and Agesilaus are both operating small cavalries in foreign lands. The purpose 
behind Xenophon’s force is to protect the retreat of the Greek army from Asia. Agesilaus 
intends to establish a force large enough to repel the Persian horsemen. Neither 
Xenophon nor Agesilaus are intent on empire. They do, however, reflect many of the 
qualities that Xenophon also attributes to Cyrus the Great. The successful cavalry 
commander, in addition to being well versed in horsemanship and cavalry tactics, must 
also be an excellent speaker and motivator. While Cyrus the Great is Xenophon’s ideal 
cavalry general, Agesilaus, and the Xenophon of the Anabasis are useful examples of 
how his ideal commander might operate in different circumstances. 
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